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Abstract—Reinforcement learning (RL) methods have demon-
strated their efficiency in simulation environments. However,
many applications for which RL offers great potential, such as
autonomous driving, are also safety critical and require a certified
closed-loop behavior in order to meet safety specifications in the
presence of physical constraints. This paper introduces a concept,
called probabilistic model predictive safety certification (PMPSC),
which can be combined with any RL algorithm and provides
provable safety certificates in terms of state and input chance
constraints for potentially large-scale systems. The certificate
is realized through a stochastic tube that safely connects the
current system state with a terminal set of states, that is
known to be safe. A novel formulation in terms of a convex
receding horizon problem allows a recursively feasible real-time
computation of such probabilistic tubes, despite the presence of
possibly unbounded disturbances. A design procedure for MPSC
relying on bayesian inference and recent advances in probabilistic
set invariance is presented. Using a numerical car simulation, the
method and its design procedure are illustrated by enhancing a
simple RL algorithm with safety certificates.
Index Terms—Reinforcement learning (RL), Stochastic sys-
tems, Predictive control, Safety
I. INTRODUCTION
WHILE the field of reinforcement learning demonstratedvarious classes of learning-based control methods in
research-driven applications [1], [2], hardly any results have
been successfully transferred to industrial applications that are
safety critical, i.e. applications that are subject to physical
and safety constraints. In industrial applications, successful
control methods are often of simple structure, such as the
Proportional–Integral–Derivative (PID) controller [3] or linear
state feedback controller [4], which require an expert to
cautiously tune them manually. Manual tuning is generally time
consuming and therefore expensive, especially in the presence
of safety specifications. Modern control methods, such as model
predictive control (MPC), tackle this problem by providing
safety guarantees w.r.t. adequate system and disturbance models
by design, reducing manual tuning requirements. The various
successful applications of MPC to safety critical systems, see
e.g. [5], [6] for an overview, reflect these capabilities.
While provable safety of control methods facilitates the
overall design procedure, tuning of various parameters, such
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as the cost function in order to achieve a desired closed-
loop behavior, still needs to be done manually and requires
a reasonable amount of experience. In contrast, RL methods
using trial-and-error procedures are often more intuitive to
design and are capable of autonomously finding a better
policy. The downside of many RL algorithms, however, is
that explicit consideration of physical system limitations and
safety requirements at each time step cannot be addressed,
often due to the complicated inner workings, which limits their
applicability in many industrial applications [7].
This paper aims at addressing this problem by introducing
a probabilistic model predictive safety certification (PMPSC)
scheme for learning-based controllers, which can equip any
controller with probabilistic constraint satisfaction guarantees.
The scheme is motivated by the following observation. Often,
an MPC controller with a short prediction horizon is sufficient
in order to provide safety of a system during closed-loop
operation, even though the same horizon would not be enough
to achieve a desired performance. For example, in case of
autonomous driving, checking if it is possible to transition the
car into a safe set of states (e.g. brake down to low velocity) can
be done efficiently by solving an open loop optimal control
problem with relatively small planning horizon (e.g. using
maximum deceleration). At the same time, a much longer
planning horizon for an MPC controller, or even another class
of control policies would be required in order to provide a
comfortable and foresightful driving experience.
This motivates the combination of ideas from MPC with RL
methods in order to achieve safe and high performance closed-
loop system operation with a possibly small amount of manual
tuning required. More precisely, a learning-based input action
is certified as safe, if it leads to a safe state, i.e., a state for
which a potentially low-performance but online computable and
safe backup controller exists for all future times. By repeatedly
computing such a backup controller for the state predicted
one step ahead after application of the learning input, it gets
either certified as safe and is applied, or it is overwritten by
the previous safe backup controller. The resulting concept can
be seen as a safety filter that only filters proposed learning
signals, for which we cannot guarantee constraint satisfaction
in the future.
Contributions: We provide a safety certification framework
which allows for enhancing arbitrary learning-based control
methods with safety guarantees1 and which is suitable for
possibly large-scale systems with continuous and chance
1Inputs provided by a human can be similarly enhanced by the safety
certification scheme, which relates e.g. to the concept of electronic stabilization
control from automotive engineering.
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2constrained input and state spaces. In order to enable efficient
implementation and scalability, we provide an online algorithm
together with a data-driven synthesis method to compute
backup solutions that can be realized by real-time capable and
established model predictive control (MPC) solvers, e.g. [8],
[9], [10]. Compared to previously presented safety frameworks
for learning-based control, e.g. [11], the set of safe state
and action pairs is implicitly represented through an online
optimization problem, enabling us to circumvent its explicit
offline computation, which generally suffers from the curse of
dimensionality.
Different from related concepts, like those presented in [12],
[13], [14], [15], we consider possibly nonlinear stochastic
systems that can be represented as linear systems with bounded
model uncertainties and possibly unbounded additive noise. For
this class of systems, we present an automated, parametrization
free and data-driven design procedure that is tailored to the
context of learning the system dynamics. Using the example of
safely learning to track a trajectory with a car, we show how
to construct a safe reinforcement learning algorithm using our
framework in combination with a basic policy search algorithm.
II. RELATED WORK
Driven by the rapid progress in reinforcement learning there
is also a growing awareness regarding safety aspects of machine
learning systems [7], see e.g. [16] for a comprehensive overview.
As opposed to most methods developed in the context of safe
RL, the approach presented in this paper keeps the system safe
at all times, including exploration, and considers continuous
state and action spaces. This is possible through the use of
models and corresponding uncertainty estimates of the system,
which can be sequentially improved by, e.g., a RL algorithm
to allow greater exploration.
In model-free safe reinforcement learning methods, policy
search algorithms have been proposed, e.g. [17], which provide
safety guarantees in expectation by solving a constrained policy
optimization using a modified trust-region policy gradient
method [18]. Efficient policy tuning with respect to best worst-
case performance (also worst-case stability under physical con-
straints) can be achieved using Bayesian min-max optimization,
see e.g. [19], or by safety constrained Bayesian optimization
as e.g. in [20], [21]. These techniques share the limitation that
they need to be tailored to a task-specific class of policies.
Furthermore, most techniques require to repeatedly execute
experiments, which prohibits fully autonomous safe learning
in ‘closed-loop’.
In [22], a method was developed that allows to analyze
a given closed-loop system (under an arbitrary RL policy)
with respect to safety, based on a probabilistic system model.
An extension of this method is presented in [23], where the
problem of updating the policy is investigated and practical
implementation techniques are provided. The techniques require
an a-priori known Lyapunov function and Lipschitz continuity
of the closed-loop learning system. In the context of model-
based safe reinforcement learning, several learning-based
model predictive control approaches are available. The method
proposed in [24] conceptually provides deterministic guarantees
on robustness, while statistical identification tools are used to
identify the system in order to improve performance. In [25],
the mentioned scheme has been tested and validated onboard
using a quadcopter. In [26], a robust constrained learning-
based model predictive control algorithm for path-tracking in
off-road terrain is studied. The experimental evaluation shows,
that the scheme is safe and conservative during initial trials,
when model uncertainty is high, and very performant, once the
model uncertainty is reduced. Regarding safety, [27] presents
a learning model predictive control method, that provides
theoretical guarantees in case of Gaussian process model
estimates. For iterative tasks, [28] proposes a learning model
predictive control scheme, that can be applied to linear system
models with bounded disturbances. Instead of using model
predictive control techniques, PILCO [29] allows to calculate
analytic policy gradients and achieves good data efficiency,
based on non-parametric Gaussian process regression.
The previously discussed literature provides specific rein-
forcement learning algorithms, that are tied to a specific, mostly
model predictive control based, policy. In contrast, the proposed
concept uses MPC-based ideas in order to establish safety,
independent of a specific reinforcement learning policy. This
offers the opportunity to apply RL for learning more complex
tasks than, e.g., steady-state stabilization, which is usually
considered in model predictive control. Many reinforcement
learning algorithms are able to maximize rewards from a
black-box function, i.e. rewards that are only available trough
measurements, which would not be possible using a model
predictive controller, where the cost enters the corresponding
online optimization problem explicitly.
Closely related to the approach proposed in this paper,
the concept of a safety framework for learning-based control
emerged from robust reachability analysis, robust invariance,
as well as classical Lyapunov-based methods [30], [11], [31],
[32]. The concept consists of a safe set in the state space and
a safety controller as originally proposed in [33] for the case
of perfectly known system dynamics in the context of safety
barrier functions. While the system state is contained in the safe
set, any feasible input (including learning-based controllers) can
be applied to the system. However, if such an input would cause
the system to leave the safe set, the safety controller interferes.
Since this strategy is compatible with any learning-based
control algorithm, it serves as a universal safety certification
concept. Previously proposed concepts are limited to a robust
treatment of the uncertainty, in order to provide rigorous safety
guarantees. This potentially results in a conservative system
behavior, or even ill-posedness of the overall safety requirement
e.g. in case of frequently considered Gaussian distributed
additive system noise which has unbounded support.
Compared to previous research using similar model predic-
tive control based safety mechanisms such as [12], [13], [14],
[15], we introduce a probabilistic formulation of the safe set
and consider safety in probability for all future times, allowing
one to prescribe a desired degree of conservatism. The proposed
method only requires an implicit description of the safe set as
opposed to an explicit representation, which enables scalability
with respect to the state dimension, while being independent
of a particular RL algorithm.
3III. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Notation
The set of symmetric matrices of dimension n is denoted
by Sn, the set of positive (semi-) definite matrices by (Sn+)
Sn++, the set of integers in the interval [a, b] ⊂ R by I[a,b],
and the set of integers in the interval [a,∞) ⊂ R by I≥a.
The Minkowski sum of two sets A1,A2 ⊂ R is denoted by
A1⊕A2 := {a1+a2|a1 ∈ A1, a2 ∈ A2} and the Pontryagin set
difference by A1	A2 := {a1 ∈ A1|a1+a2 ∈ A2, ∀a2 ∈ A2}.
The i-th row and i-th column of a matrix A ∈ Rn×m is denoted
by rowi(A) and coli(A), respectively. The expression x ∼ Qx
means that a random variable x is distributed according to
the distribution Qx, and N (µ,Σ) is a multivariate Gaussian
distribution with mean µ ∈ Rn and covariance Σ ∈ Rn×n,
Σ  0. The probability of an event E is denoted by Pr(E).
For a random variable x, E(x) and var(x) denote the expected
value and the variance.
B. Problem statement
We consider a-priori unknown nonlinear, time-invariant
discrete-time dynamical systems of the form
x(k+1) = f(x(k), u(k)) + ws(k), ∀k ∈ I≥0 (1)
subject to polytopic state and input constraints x(k) ∈ X,
u(k) ∈ U, and i.i.d. stochastic disturbances ws(k) ∼ Qws .
For controller design, we consider an approximate model
description of the following form
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k) + wm(x(k), u(k)) + ws(k),
(2)
where A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×m are typically obtained from
linear system identification techniques, see e.g. [34], and
wm(x(k), u(k)) accounts for model errors.
In order to provide safety certificates, we require that the
model error wm(x(k), u(k)) is contained with a certain proba-
bility in a model error set Wm ⊂ Rn, where Wm is chosen
based on available data D = {(xi, ui), f(xi, ui) + ws,i}NDi=1.
Assumption III.1 (Bounded model error). The deviation
between the true system (1) and the corresponding model (2)
is bounded by
Pr
(
wm(x(k), u(k)) ∈Wm
∀k ∈ I≥0, x(k) ∈ Rn, u(k) ∈ Rm
)
≥ pm (3)
where pm > 0 denotes the probability level. C
A principled way to infer a system model of the form (2)
and the corresponding bound according to Assumption III.1
from available data is discussed in Section (V).
In this paper, system safety is defined as a required degree
of constraint satisfaction in the form of probabilistic state and
input constraints, i.e., as chance-constraints of the form
Pr(x(k) ∈ X) ≥ px , Pr(u(k) ∈ U) ≥ pu , (4)
for all k ∈ I≥0 with probabilities px, pu ≥ 0.
The overall goal is to certify safety of arbitrary control
signals uL(k) ∈ Rm, e.g, provided by an RL algorithm. This
is achieved by means of a safety policy, which is computed
in real time based on the current system state x(k) and the
proposed input uL(k). A safety policy consists of a safe input
uS(k) at time k and a safe backup trajectory that guarantees
safety with respect to the constraints (4) when applied in
future time instances. The safety policy is updated at every
time step, such that the first input equals uL(k) if that is safe
and otherwise implements a minimal safe modification. More
formally:
Definition III.2. An input uL(k¯) is certified as safe for
system (1) at time step k¯ and state x(k¯) w.r.t. a safety policy
piS : I≥k¯ × Rn × Rm → Rm, if piS(k¯) = uL(k¯) and
u(k) = piS(k, x(k), uL(k)) for k ≥ k¯ keeps the system safe,
i.e. satisfies (4) for all k ≥ k¯. C
By assuming that a safety policy can be found for the
initial system state, Definition III.2 implies the following safety
algorithm. At every time step, safety of a proposed input uL(k)
is verified using the safety policy according to Definition III.2.
If safety cannot be verified, the proposed input is modified and
u(k¯) = piS(k¯, x(k¯), uL(k¯)) is applied to the system instead,
ensuring safety until the next state and learning input pair can
be certified as safe again. The set of initial states for which piS
ensures safety can thus be interpreted as a safe set of system
states and represents a probabilistic variant of the safe set
definition in [12].
In the following, we present a method to compute a safety
policy piS for uncertain models of the form (2) making use of
model predictive control (MPC) techniques, which provide real-
time feasibility and scalability of the approach while aiming
at a large safe set implicitly defined by the safety policy.
IV. PROBABILISTIC MODEL PREDICTIVE SAFETY
CERTIFICATION
The fundamental idea of model predictive safety certification,
which was introduced for linear deterministic systems in [12], is
the on-the-fly computation of a safety policy piS , that ensures
constraint satisfaction at all times in the future. The safety
policy is specified using MPC methods, i.e., an input sequence
is computed that safely steers the system to a terminal safe
set Xf , which can be done efficiently in real-time. The first
input is selected as the learning input if possible, in which
case it is certified as safe, or selected as ‘close’ as possible to
the learning input otherwise. A specific choice of the terminal
safe set Xf allows to show that a previous solution at time
k − 1 implies the existence of a feasible solution at time k,
ensuring safety for all future times. Such terminal sets Xf can,
e.g., be a neighborhood of a locally stable steady-state of the
system (1), or a possibly conservative set of states for which
a safe controller is known.
A. Nominal model predictive safety certification scheme
In order to introduce the basic idea of the presented approach,
we introduce a nominal model predictive safety certification
(NMPSC) scheme under the simplifying assumption that the
system dynamics (1) are perfectly known, time-independent,
and without noise, i.e. x(k + 1) = f(x(k), u(k)) ∀k ∈ I≥0.
The mechanism to construct the safety policy for certifying a
4min
ui|k,xi|k
∥∥uL − u0|k∥∥
s.t. ∀i ∈ I[0,N−1] :
xi+1|k = f(xi|k, ui|k), (5a)
xi|k ∈ X (5b)
ui|k ∈ U (5c)
xN |k ∈ Xf (5d)
x0|k = x(k) (5e)
X
Xf
x(k)
x∗2|k−1
x∗3|k−1x∗4|k−1
f(x(k), uL(k)) = x∗1|kx
∗
2|k
x∗3|k
x∗4|k
min
vi|k,zi|k
∥∥uL − v0|k −KR(x(k)− z0|k)∥∥
s.t. ∀i ∈ I[0,N−1] :
zi+1|k = Azi|k +Bvi|k (6a)
zi|k ∈ X	Rx, (6b)
vi|k ∈ U	KRRu (6c)
zN |k ∈ Zf (6d)
z0|k = z(k) (6e)
X
X	 Ωx
Zf
z(k)
z∗2|k−1
z∗3|k−1z∗4|k−1
f(z(k), vL(k)) = z∗1|kz
∗
2|k
z∗3|k
z∗4|k
x(k)
xL(k+1)
Fig. 1: Mechanism in order to construct a safety policy ‘on-the-fly’: Depicted is the system at time k, with current backup solution in brown.
A proposed learning input uL is certified by constructing a safe solution for the following time step, shown in green. Existence of a safe
trajectory is ensured by extending the brown trajectory using Assumption IV.1 and IV.4 respectively. Left (NMPSC): Safe solutions are
computed w.r.t. the true state dynamics, and constraints x ∈ X are guaranteed to be satisfied. Right (PMPSC): Safe solutions are computed
w.r.t. the nominal state z. The true state lies within the tube around the nominal state with probability px. By enforcing z ∈ X	Rx constraint
satisfaction holds with at least the same probability.
given control input is based on concepts from model predictive
control [35] as illustrated in Figure 1 (left) with the difference
that we aim at certifying an external learning signal uL instead
of performing, e.g., safe steady-state or trajectory tracking.
The safety policy piS is defined implicitly through optimiza-
tion problem (5), unifying certification and computation of
the safety policy. Thereby, problem (5) does not only describe
the computation of a safety policy based on the current state
x(k) and according to Definition (III.2), but also provides a
mechanism in order to modify the learning-based control input
uL(k) as little as necessary in order to find a safe backup
policy for the predicted state at time k + 1.
In (5), xi|k is the state predicted i time steps ahead, computed
at time k, i.e. x0|k = x(k). Problem (5) computes an N -step
input sequence {u∗i|k} satisfying the input constraints U, such
that the predicted states satisfy the constraints X and reach
the terminal safe set Xf after N steps, where N ∈ I≥1 is the
prediction horizon. The safety controller piS is defined as the
first input u∗0|k of the computed optimal input sequence driving
the system to the terminal set, which guarantees safety for all
future times via an invariance property.
Assumption IV.1 (Nominal invariant terminal set). There exists
a nominal terminal invariant set Xf ⊆ X and a corresponding
control law κf : Xf → U, such that for all x ∈ Xf it holds
κf (x) ∈ U and f(x, κf (x)) ∈ Xf . C
Assumption IV.1 provides recursive feasibility of opti-
mization problem (5) and therefore infinite-time constraint
satisfaction, i.e., if there exists a feasible solution at time k,
there exists one at k+1 and therefore at all future times, see
e.g. [35].
The safety certification scheme then works as follows.
Consider a measured system state x(k − 1), for which (5)
is feasible and the input trajectory {u∗i|k−1} is computed. After
applying the first input to the system u(k − 1) = u∗0|k−1,
the resulting state x(k) is measured again. Because it holds
in the nominal case that x(k) = x∗1|k−1, a valid input
sequence {u∗1|k−1, . . . , u∗N−1|k−1, κf (x∗N |k−1)} is known from
the previous time step, which satisfies constraints and steers
the state to the safe terminal set Xf as indicated by the brown
trajectory in Figure 1 (left). Safety of a proposed learning input
uL is certified by solving optimization problem (5), which,
if feasible for u0|k = uL, provides the green trajectory in
Figure 1 (left) such that uL can be safely applied to the system.
Should problem (5) not be feasible for u0|k = uL, it returns
an alternative input sequence that safely guides the system
towards the safe set Xf . The first element of this sequence
u∗0|k is chosen as close as possible to uL and is applied to
system (1) instead of uL. Due to recursive feasibility, i.e.,
knowledge of the brown trajectory in Figure 1 (left), such a
solution always exists, ensuring safety.
In the context of learning-based control, the true system
dynamics are rarely known accurately. In order to derive a
probabilistic version of the NMPSC scheme that accounts
for uncertainty in the system model (2) in the following, we
leverage advances in probabilistic stochastic model predictive
5control [36], based on so-called probabilistic reachable sets.
B. Probabilistic model predictive safety certification scheme
In the case of uncertain system dynamics, the safety policy
consists of two components following a tube-based MPC
concept [35]. The first component considers a nominal state
of the system z(k) driven by linear dynamics, and computes a
nominal safe trajectory {z∗i|k, v∗i|k}, which is similar to the case
of perfectly known dynamics introduced in the previous section.
The second component consists of an auxiliary controller, which
acts on the deviation e(k) of the true system state from the
nominal one and ensures that the true state x(k) remains close
to the nominal trajectory. Specifically, it guarantees that e(k)
stays within a set R, often called the ‘tube’, with probability
at least px. Together, the resulting safety policy is able to steer
the system state x(k) within the probabilistic tube along the
nominal trajectory towards the safe terminal set.
We first define the main components and assumptions, in
order to then introduce the probabilistic model predictive safety
certification (PMPSC) problem together with the proposed
safety controller. Define with z(k) ∈ Rn and v(k) ∈ Rm
the nominal system states and inputs, as well as the nominal
dynamics according to model (2) as
z(k+1) = Az(k) +Bv(k), k ∈ I≥0 (7)
with initial condition z(0) = x(0). For example, one might
choose matrices (A,B) in the context of learning time-invariant
linear systems based on the maximum likelihood estimate of
the true system dynamics. Denote e(k) := x(k) − z(k) as
the error (deviation) between the true system state, evolving
according to (1), and the nominal system state following (7).
The controller is then defined by augmenting the nominal input
with an auxiliary feedback on the error, in the case of a linear
system (7) a linear state feedback controller KR
u(k) = v(k) +KR(x(k)− z(k)), (8)
which keeps the real system state x(k) close to the nominal sys-
tem state z(k), i.e. keeps the error e(k) small, if KR ∈ Rm×n
is chosen such that it stabilizes system (7). By Assumption III.1,
the model error wm(x(k), u(k)) is contained in Wm for all
time steps with probability pm. Therefore, we drop the state and
input dependencies in the following and simply refer to wm(k)
as model mismatch at time k, such that the error dynamics
can be expressed as
e(k+1) = x(k+1)− z(k+1)
= f(x(k), u(k)) + ws(k)−Az(k)−Bv(k)
= f(x(k), u(k))−Ax(k)−Bu(k)
+Ax(k) +Bu(k) + ws(k)−Az(k)−Bv(k)
= (A+BKR)e(k) + wm(k) + ws(k). (9)
By setting the initial nominal state to the real state, i.e.,
z(0) = x(0) ⇒ e(0) = 0, the goal is to keep the evolving
error e(k), i.e. the deviation to the nominal reference trajectory,
small in probability with levels px and pu for state and input
constraints (4), respectively. This requirement can be formalized
using the concept of probabilistic reachable sets introduced
in [37], [38], [36].
Definition IV.2. A set R is a probabilistic reachable set (PRS)
at probability level p for system (9) if
e(0) = 0⇒ Pr(e(k) ∈ R) ≥ p, (10)
for all k ∈ I≥0. C
In Section V-A it is shown how to compute PRS setsRx,Ru,
corresponding to state and input chance constraints (4), in order
to fulfill the following Assumption.
Assumption IV.3 (Probabilistic tube). There exists a linear
state feedback matrix KR ∈ Rm×n, that stabilizes system (7).
The corresponding PRS sets for the error dynamics (9) with
probability levels px and pu are denoted by Rx,Ru ⊆ Rn. C
Based on Assumption IV.3, it is possible to define determin-
istic constraints on the nominal system (7), that capture the
chance constraints (4), by choosing X	Rx and U	KRRu as
depicted in Figure 1 (right), in which the grey circles illustrate
the PRS centered around the predicted nominal state z, such
that they contain the true state x with probability px. Through
calculation of the nominal safety policy towards a safe terminal
set within the tightened constraints, and by application of (8),
finite-time chance-constraint satisfaction upon the planning
horizon k+N follows directly by Definition IV.2 and Assump-
tion IV.3. In order to provide ‘infinite’ horizon safety through
recursive feasibility of (6), we require a terminal invariant set
for the nominal system state Zf similar to Assumption IV.1,
which is contained in the tightened constraints.
Assumption IV.4 (Nominal terminal set). There exists a
terminal invariant set Zf ⊆ X 	 Rx and a corresponding
control law κf : Zf → U	KRRu such that for all z ∈ Zf
it holds κf (z) ∈ U	KRRu and Az +Bκf ∈ Zf . C
In classical tube-based and related stochastic MPC methods,
the nominal system (7) is reset at each time step in order to
minimize the nominal objective. While a re-initialization of the
nominal-, and therefore also of the error system, works in a
robust setting, it prohibits a direct probabilistic analysis using
PRS according to Definition IV.2, that only provide statements
about the autonomous error system, starting from time k = 0
and evolving linearly for all future times. Consequently and
in contrast to classical formulations, we virtually simulate (7)
via (6e), which leads to the error dynamics (9) despite online
replanning of the nominal trajectory at each time step, compare
also with Figure 2 accompanying the proof of Theorem IV.5.
Building on the tube-based controller structure, an input is
certified as safe if it can be represented in the form of (8)
by selecting v∗0 accordingly. Otherwise an alternative input
is provided ensuring that Pr(e(k) ∈ Rx) ≥ px, Pr(e(k) ∈
Ru) ≥ pu for all k ∈ I≥0. Combining this mechanism with
the assumptions from above yield the main result of the paper.
Theorem IV.5. Let Assumptions IV.3 and IV.4 hold. If (6)
is feasible for z∗0|−1 = x(0), then system (1) under the
control law (8) with v(k) = v∗0|k resulting from the PMPSC
6x(k)
e(k)
z∗1|k−1
u(k) = v∗1|k−1 + KR(x(k)− z∗1|k−1)
z∗2|k−1
v∗1|k−1
{(A + BKR)e(k)⊕Wm}
u(k) = uL(k) = v∗0|k + KR(x(k)− z∗0|k)
z∗1|k
v∗0|k
{(A + BKR)e(k)⊕Wm}
Fig. 2: Illustration of the idea underlying the proof of Theorem IV.5 without stochastic noise, i.e. ws(k) = 0, and Wm polytopic. Starting
from x(k), the set of possible reachable states for x(k + 1) under the safety policy u(k) = v∗1|k−1 + KΩ(x(k)− z∗1|k−1) from the previous
time step is indicated by the three dotted black arrows. The corresponding predicted error set with respect to the nominal system is given
by {(A + BKR)e(k)⊕Wm} as shown in red. Solving (6) yields the optimal input u(k) = v∗0|k + KΩ(x(k)− z∗0|k), which preserves the
predicted error set, enabling to probabilistically bound the error within the PRS Rx,Ru from Assumption IV.3.
problem (6) is safe for all uL(k) and for all times, i.e., the
chance constraints (4) are satisfied for all k ≥ 0. C
Proof. We begin by investigating the error dynamics under (8).
By (6e) it follows that e(k) evolves for all k ∈ I≥0, despite re-
optimizing vi|k, zi|k, based on uL(k) according to (6) at every
time step, see also Figure 2. Therefore Pr(e(k) ∈ Rx) ≥ px
and Pr(e(k) ∈ Ru) ≥ pu for all k ∈ I≥0 by Assumption IV.3
and z∗0|−1 = x(0).
Next, Assumption IV.4 provides recursive feasibility of
optimization problem (6), i.e. if there exists a feasible solution
at time k, there will always exist one at k+1, specifically
{v∗1|k, . . . , v∗N−1|k, κf (z∗N |k)} is a feasible solution, which
implies feasibility of (6) for all k ≥ 0 by induction.
Finally, by recursive feasibility it follows that z(k) ∈ X	
Rx and v(k) ∈ U 	 KRRu for all k ∈ I≥0, implying in
combination with Pr(e(k) ∈ Rx) ≥ px and Pr(e(k) ∈ Ru) ≥
pu for all k ∈ I≥0 that Pr{x(k) = z(k) + e(k) ∈ X} ≥ px
and Pr{u(k) = v(k) +KRe(k) ∈ U} ≥ pu for all k ∈ I≥0.
We therefore proved, that if (6) is feasible for z∗0|−1 = x(0),
(8) will always provide a control input such that constraints
(4) are satisfied.
Remark IV.6 (Recursive feasibility despite unbounded distur-
bances). Various recent stochastic model predictive control
approaches, which consider chance-constraints in the presence
of unbounded additive noise, are also based on constraint
tightening (see [39], [40], [41], [36]). The techniques employ
a recovery mechanism in order to account for infeasibility of
the online MPC problem. In contrast, the proposed formulation
offers inherent recursive feasibility, even for unbounded distur-
bance realizations ws(k), by simulating the nominal system and
therefore not optimizing over z0. While optimization over z0
usually enables state feedback in tube-based stochastic model
predictive control methods, we incorporate state feedback
through the cost function of (6). A similar strategy can also
be used for recursively feasible stochastic MPC schemes as
presented in [42]. C
V. DATA BASED DESIGN
In order to employ the PMPSC scheme the following
components must be provided: The model description (2)
of the true system (1) (Section V-A), the probabilistic error
tubes Rx and Ru based on the model (2) according to
Assumption IV.3 (Section V-B), and the nominal terminal
set Zf , which provides recursive feasibility according to
Assumption IV.4 (Section V-C). In this section, we present
efficient techniques for computing those components that are
taylored to the learning-based control setup by solely relying
on available data collected from the system.
A. Model design
For simplicity, we focus on systems that can be approximated
by linear Bayesian regression [43], [44] of the form
x(k + 1) = θ>( xu ) + ws(k) (11)
with unknown parameter matrix θ ∈ Rn×n+m, which is
inferred from noisy measurements D = {(xi, ui), yi}NDi=1 with
yk = f(x(k), u(k)) + ws(k), ws(k) ∼ Qws , using a prior
distribution Qθ on the parameters θ. Note that distribution
pairs Qws and Qθ that allow for efficient posterior computation,
e.g. Gaussian distributions, usually exhibit infinite support, i.e.
ws(k) ∈ Rn, which can generally not be treated robustly using,
e.g., the related method presented in [12]. In the following,
we present one way of obtaining the required model error set
Wm using confidence sets of the posterior distribution Qθ|D.
7We start by describing the set of all realizations of (11),
which contain the true system with probability pm. To this end
let the confidence region at probability level pm of the random
vector θ ∼ Qθ|D, denoted by Epm(Qθ|D), be defined such that
Pr(θ ∈ Epm(Qθ|D)) ≥ pm (12)
and compare the corresponding set of system dynamics against
the expected system dynamics, which is in the considered case
given by
E(θ)>︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:[A,B]
(
x(k)
u(k)
)
. (13)
Note that the model error between (11) and (13) is unbounded
by definition, if we consider an unbounded domain as required
by (3) since lim‖(x,u)‖2→∞ ||((A,B)− θ˜>)(x, u)||2 =∞ for
any θ˜ ∈ Epm(Qθ|D) such that θ˜ 6= θ. We therefore make the
practical assumption, that the model error is bounded outside a
sufficiently large ‘outer’ state and input space Xo×Uo ⊇ X×U,
as illustrated in Figure 3, which relates to Assumption III.1 as
follows.
Assumption V.1 (Bounded model error). The set
W˜m := {wm ∈ Rn|∀(x, u, θ) ∈ Xo × Uo × Epm(Qθ|D)
Ax+Bu+ wm = θ
>( xu )}.
is an overbound of Wm according to Assumption III.1, i.e.
Wm ⊆ W˜m. C
A simple but efficient computation scheme for overapproxi-
mating W˜m using Epm(Qθ|D) can be developed for the special
case of a Gaussian prior distribution coli(θ) ∼ N (0,Σθi ) and
Gaussian distributed process noise ws(k) ∼ N (0, Inσ2s). We
begin with the posterior distribution Qθ|D of θ conditioned on
data D, given by
p(coli(θ)|D) = N (σ−2s C−1i Xcoli(y), C−1i ), (14)
where rowi(X) = φ(xi, ui)>, rowi(y) = y>i , and Ci =
σ−2s XX
> + (Σθi )
−1, see, e.g. [45], [43].
Using the posterior distribution Qθ|D according to (14)
we compute a polytopic outer approximation of Epm(Qθ|D)
in a second step, which can be used in order to finally
obtain an approximation of W˜m and therefore Wm since
W ⊆ W˜m by Assumption V.1. To this end, consider the
vectorized model parameters vec(θ) and their confidence
set Epm(Qvec(θ)) = {vec(θ) ∈ Rn
2+mm|vec(θ)>Cvec(θ) ≤
χ2n2+mn(pm)}, where χ2n2+mn is the chi-squared distribution
of degree n2 +mn and
C :=

C1 0 · · · 0
0 C2 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 0
... Cn

is the posterior covariance according to (14). A computationally
cheap outer approximation of Epm(Qvec(θ)) can be obtained by
picking its major axes {θ˜i}n
2+mn
i=1 using singular value decom-
position of C, which provide the vertices of an inner polytopic
approximation co({θ˜i}n
2+mn
i=1 ) of Epm(Qvec(θ)). Scaling this
x
∂X
∂X
∂Xo
∂Xo
Ax
f(x)
Fig. 3: Bounded error (dashed red lines) between the nominal
model Ax (blue line) in (2) and the true dynamics f(x) (gray
line) beyond the outer bound ∂Xo of the state space X according
to Assumption V.1.
inner approximation by
√
n2 +mn [46] yields vertices of an
outer polytopic approximation of Epm(Qvec(θ)) given by the
convex hull co({θi}n
2+mn
i=1 ) with θi =
√
n2 +mnθ˜i.
Based on this outer approximation of Epm(Qvec(θ)), it is
possible to compute a corresponding outer approximation of
W˜m as follows. Due to convexity of co({θi}n
2+mn
i=1 ), it is
sufficient to impose
θ>i (
x
u )− (Ax+Bu) ∈ W˜m (15)
for all i ∈ I[1,n2+mn], x ∈ Xo, u ∈ Uo, since by definition of
Epm(Qvec(θ)) and Assumption V.1 we have with probability at
least pm that there exist λi(x, u) ≥ 0 with
∑n2
i=1 λi(x, u) = 1
such that
f(x, u) = θ¯(x, u)>( xu )
=
n2∑
i=1
λi(x, u)θ
>
i (
x
u )
∈
n2∑
i=1
λi(x, u)
(
Ax+Bu⊕ W˜m
)
∈ {Ax+Bu} ⊕ W˜m.
Therefore, (15) can be used in order to construct an outer
approximation W˜m = {w ∈ Rn| ||w||2 ≤ wmax}, where
wmax := max
i∈I[1,n2+mn]
(
max
x∈Xo,u∈Uo
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(θ>i − (A B))(xu
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
)
(16)
with (A B) := E(θ)>, {θi}n
2+mn
i=1 =
√
2{θ˜i}n
2+mn
i=1 and θ˜i
the major axes of Epm(Qvec(θ)).
Remark V.2 (Gaussian processes). Instead of linear Bayesian
regression, one could also use Gaussian process regression by
assuming that the system dynamics (1) has bounded norm in a
reproducing kernel Hilbert space. The model error set Wm can
then be derived using the bound presented in [47, Theorem 2].
By using, e.g., the nominal linear model (2) as prior mean
function and a stationary kernel function, the uncertainty tends
to a constant value around the prior mean function (2) for
values of x outside of Xo, meaning that Xo would have to be
chosen according to the length-scale. C
8B. Calculation of R for uncertain linear dynamics and
unbounded disturbances
In this subsection, we provide a method to compute a
PRS set R with pre-specified probability level p according to
Assumption IV.3 that can be used for obtaining both, a PRS Rx
at probability level px corresponding to the state constraints
(4), and a PRS Ru at probability level pu for input constraints,
respectively. As commonly done in the context of related MPC
methods, the computations are based on choosing a stabilizing
tube controller KR in (8) first, e.g. using LQR design, in order
to efficiently compute the PRS Rx and Ru afterwards.
The proposed PRS computation distinguishes between an
error resulting from model mismatch between (1) and (2), and
an error caused by possibly unbounded process noise due to
ws(k) ∼ Qws . The error system (9) admits a decomposition
e(k) = em(k) + es(k) with e(0) = em(0) = es(0) = 0 and
em(k) = (A+BKR)em(k) + wm(k), (17)
es(k) = (A+BKR)es(k) + ws(k). (18)
While the fact that Qws is known allows us to compute
a PRS with respect to es(k) as described in V-B a), the
model error em(k) is state and input dependent with unknown
distribution. Therefore, we bound em robustly in probability
using the concept of robust invariance, i.e., a robustly positive
invariant set accounts deterministically for all possible model
mismatches wm(k) ∈Wm at probability level pm according
to the following definition.
Definition V.3. A set E is said to be a robustly positive invariant
set (RIS) for system (17) if em(0) ∈ E implies that em(k) ∈ E
for all k ∈ I≥0. It is called a RIS at probability level pm if
Pr(E is RIS) ≥ pm. C
This enables us to state the following lemma for the
cumulated error e(k) according to (9).
Lemma V.4. If E is a RIS at probability level pm for the
model error system (17) and Rs is a PRS for the disturbance
error system (18) at probability level ps, then R = E ⊕Rs is
a PRS for the cumulated error system (9) at probability level
pmps. C
Proof. By the definition of the Minkowski sum, em(k) ∈ E
and es(k) ∈ Rs implies e(k) ∈ R for any k ∈ I≥0. Choosing
es(0) = em(0) = 0 yields for all k ∈ I≥0
Pr(e(k) ∈ R) ≥ Pr(em(k) ∈ E ∧ es(k) ∈ Rs)
= Pr(em(k) ∈ E) Pr(es(k) ∈ Rs)
≥ pmps,
which proves the result.
Lemma V.4 allows for computing the PRS Rs, that accounts
for the stochastic disturbances (18) independently of the RIS
E , dealing with the model uncertainty W˜. In the following
we present one option for determining Rs and refer to [36]
for further computation methods. Then, based on the model
obtained from Section V-A, an optimization problem for the
synthesis of E is given.
a) PRS Rs for stochastic errors: Using the variance
var(Qws) and the Chebyshev bound, a popular way in order
to compute Rs is given by solving the Lyapunov equation
A>clΣ∞Acl − Σ∞ = −var(Qws) for Σ∞, which yields the
PRS Rs = {es ∈ Rn|e>s Σ∞es ≤ p˜} with probability level
p = 1− nx/p˜, see e.g. [36]. Furthermore, if Qws is a normal
distribution, Rs with p˜ = χ2n(p) is a PRS of probability level
p, where χ2n(p) is the quantile function of the n-dimensional
chi-squared distribution.
b) RIS E for ellipsoidal model errors: Given a bound
on the model error according to Assumption III.1 of the form
Wm = {w ∈ Rn | w>Q−1w ≤ 1} with Q ∈ Sn++, e.g.
Q−1 := Inw−2max using (16), we can make use of methods
from robust control [48] in order to construct a possibly small
set Eα = {e|e>Pe ≤ α} at probability level pm by solving
max
α−1,τ0,τ1
α−1 (19a)
s.t. :(
A>clPAcl − τ0P A>clP
PAcl P − τ1Q−1
)
 0 (19b)
1− τ0 − p¯τ1α−1 ≥ 0 , (19c)
τ0, τ1 > 0 , (19d)
where P ∈ Sn++ has to be pre-selected using, e.g., the infinite
horizon LQR cost x(k)>Px(k), corresponding to the LQR
feedback u(k) = KRx(k). As pointed out in [49], optimization
problem (19) has a monotonicity property in the bilinearity
τ1α
−1 such that it can be efficiently solved using bisection on
the variable α−1. A more advanced design procedure, yielding
less conservative robust invariant sets, can be found, e.g., in
[50].
In summary, based on the uncertainty of the linear model
with respect to the true model (1) inferred from data and
by solving (19), we obtain a RIS Eα at probability level pm,
which contains the model error (17). Together with the PRS
Rs from Section V-B a), Lemma V.4 provides the overall PRS
for the error system (9), which is given by R = Rs ⊕ Eα at
probability level pspm. Note that the ratio between pm and ps
can be freely chosen in order to obtain overall tubes Rx, Ru at
probability levels px = pRxs p
Rx
m and pu = p
Ru
s p
Ru
m according
to the chance constraints (4).
C. Iterative construction of the terminal safe set Zf
While the terminal constraint (6d) in combination with
Assumption IV.4 is key in order to provide a safe backup
control policy piS for all future times, it can restrict the feasible
set of (6). The goal is therefore to provide a large terminal set
Zf yielding potentially less conservative modifications of the
proposed learning-based control input uL according to (6).
This can be iteratively achieved by recycling previously
calculated solutions to (6), starting from a potentially conser-
vative initial terminal set Zf according to Assumption IV.4.
Such an initialization can be computed using standard invariant
set methods for linear systems, see e.g. [51] and references
therein. Note, that the underlying idea of iteratively enlarging
the terminal set is related to the concepts presented, e.g., in [52],
[53].
9Let the set of nominal initial states obtained from successfully
solved instances of (6) be denoted by z∗(k) = {z∗0(x(i)), i ∈
I[1,k]}.
Proposition V.5. If Assumption IV.4 holds for Zf and (6) is
convex, then the set
Zkf := co(z∗(k)) ∪ Zf (20)
satisfies Assumption IV.4. C
Proof. We proceed similar to the proof of [12, Theorem
IV.2]. Let z ∈ Zkf and note, that if (6) convex, then the
feasible set is a convex set, see e.g. [46], and therefore
co(z∗(k)) is a subset of the feasible set. From here, it follows
together with the fact that the system dynamics is linear, that
there exist multipliers λi ≥ 0, Σki=1λi = 1 such that we
have z = Σki=1λiz
∗
0(x(i)) as well as corresponding state
and input trajectories {Σki=1λiz∗0(x(i)), ..,Σki=1λiz∗N (x(i))}
and {Σki=1λiv∗0(x(i)), ..,Σki=1λiv∗N−1(x(i))} that satisfy state,
input, and terminal constraints due to the convexity of these
sets. We can therefore explicitly state
κ
z∗(k)
f (k, z(k)) =
{
Σki=1λiv
∗
k(x(i)), if k ∈ I[0,N−1],
κf (z), else
as the required nominal terminal control law according to
Assumption IV.4. Noting that co(z∗(k)) ⊆ X	Rx and v∗k|0 ⊆
U 	 KRRu by (6b), (6c) shows that for all z ∈ Zkf there
exists a control law κ¯f according to Assumption IV.4, which
completes the proof.
D. Overall MPSC design procedure
Given the methods presented in this section, the MPSC
problem synthesis from data can be summarized as follows.
Step 1: Construct the model representation (2) based on
measurements as described in Section V-A.
Step 2: Compute the corresponding PRS Rx, Ru according
to Section V-B.
Step 3: Initialize Zf = {0} (principled ways in order
to calculate less restrictive Zf can be found for
example in [51]) and collect the nominal trajectories
during closed-loop operation to iteratively enlarge
Zf according to (20).
Step 4: Collected state measurements can in addition be used
to reduce model uncertainty, allowing tighter bounds
on wm and recomputation of Rx,Ru, which enables
greater exploration of the system in the future.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE: SAFELY LEARNING TO
CONTROL A CAR
In this section, we apply the proposed PMPSC scheme in
order to safely learn how to drive a simulated autonomous car
along a desired trajectory without leaving a narrow road. For
the car simulation we consider the dynamics
x˙ = v cos(θ) θ˙ = (v/L) tan(δ) 11+(v/vCH)
y˙ = v sin(θ) δ˙ = (1/Tδ)(uδ − δ)
v˙ = a a˙ = (1/Ta)(ua − a), (21)
with position (x, y) in world coordinates, orientation θ, velocity
v, acceleration a, and steering angle δ, where the acceleration
rate is modeled by a first-order lag with respect to the desired
acceleration (system input) ua, and the angular velocity of
the steering angle is also modeled by a first-order lag w.r.t.
the desired steering angle (system input) uδ. The system is
subject to the state and input constraints ||δ|| ≤ 0.7 [rad],
||v|| ≤ 19.8 [m s−1], −6 ≤ a ≤ 2 [m s−2], ||uδ|| ≤ 0.7 [rad],
and −6 ≤ ua ≤ 2 [m s−2], for which the true car dynamics
can be approximately represented by (21), see e.g. [54], with
parameters Tδ = 0.08 [s], Ta = 0.3 [s], L = 2.9 [m], and
vCH = 20 [m s
−2]. The system is discretized with a sampling
time of 0.1 [s].
The learning task is to find a control law, that tracks a
periodic reference trajectory on a narrow road, which translates
in an additional safety constraint ||y|| ≤ 1. The terminal set
according to Assumption IV.4 is defined as the road center
with angles θ = δ = 0 and acceleration a = 0, which is
a safe set for (21) with κf = 0. The planning horizon is
selected to N = 30 and the model (2) as well as the PRS set
Rx = Ru with probability level 98% is computed based on a
40 second state and input trajectory according to Section V, see
supplementary material for further details. We use Augmented
Random Policy Search (ARS) (see [55]) for learning the control
law, implementing a basic policy search method, which does
not provide inherent safety guarantees. As cost function for
each episode, we penalize the deviation from the reference
trajectory quadratically, i.e.,
N∑
i=1
(xref(i)− x(i))>Q(xref(i)− x(i)) + uL(i)RuL(i),
where Q = diag((1 1.5 1 1 100 100)>) and R = diag((1 1)>).
If ARS is applied together with the PMPSC scheme, we add
in addition the term (u(i) − uL(i))>RS(u(i) − uL(i)) with
RS = diag((1 1)>), in order to account for deviations between
the proposed and applied input to system (1), which implies a
higher cost for unsafe policies.
While the resulting learning episodes using ARS without the
probabilistic model predictive certification framework would
leave the safety constraints, i.e. the road, in a significant number
of samples, as shown in Figure 4, the safety framework enables
safe learning in every episode.
In Figure 5, three example learning episodes from 4 are
shown indicating interventions of the safety framework with
red dots. While at episodes 50 and 3106 the safety framework
intervenes with the ARS policy search in order to ensure safety,
the algorithm safely begins to converge at 4000 Episodes, which
corresponds to the typical amount of episodes needed for ARS
policy search [55].
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has introduced a methodology to enhance arbitrary
RL algorithms with safety guarantees during the process of
learning. The scheme is based on a data-driven, linear belief
approximation of the system dynamics, that is used in order
to compute safety policies for the learning-based controller
‘on-the-fly’. By proving existence of a safety policy policy at
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Fig. 4: Learning to track a periodic trajectory subject to
constraints: Shown are the 4000 learning episodes without
(red) and with (green) the proposed PMPSC framework as well
as the safety constraints (black).
Fig. 5: Resulting safe learning-based controller: Dashed gray
line shows the reference trajectory and the solid lines with
green/red segments show the closed-loop trajectory resulting
from the ARS policy in combination with the presented PMPSC
scheme after 50, 3106, and 4000 learning episodes . Green
dots indicate unmodified application of the ARS policy, while
red dots illustrate safety ensuring modifications.
all time steps, safety of the closed-loop system is established.
Principled design steps for the scheme are introduced, based
on Bayesian inference and convex optimization, which require
little system expert knowledge in order to realize safe RL
applications.
APPENDIX
A. Details of numerical example
The model is computed according to Section V-A based on
measurements of system (21) as depicted in Figure 6, sensor
noise σs = 0.01 and prior distribution Σ
p
i = 10In. The state
feedback
KR =
(−1.25 −0.05 −2.34 −0.75 −0.19 0.02
0.02 −0.69 −0.03 0.02 −5.04 −2.85
)
according to Assumption IV.3 is computed according to the
mean dynamics of (13) using LQR design.
Applying the procedure described in Section V-B yields the
PRS set R = {x ∈ R6|x>Px ≤ 1} with
P =

11.62 −0.06 12.34 4.42 0.14 0.10
−0.06 10.54 0.29 0.03 30.176 6.74
12.34 0.29 51.44 12.20 2.29 0.67
4.42 0.03 12.20 15.60 0.24 0.08
0.14 30.17 2.29 0.24 188.51 46.48
0.10 6.74 0.67 0.08 46.48 27.69

Fig. 6: Measurements of system (21), which are used for
computing the PIS set R.
and tightened input and state constraints ||uδ|| ≤ 0.75 [rad],
−5.4 ≤ ua ≤ 1.3 [m s−2], ||y|| ≤ 0.58 [m], ||δ|| ≤ 0.45 [rad],
||v|| ≤ 19.8 [m s−1], −4.7 ≤ a ≤ 0.21 [m s−2], computed
using the MPT-Toolbox [56].
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